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NECESSARY GRATUITOUS EVIL: 
AN OXYMORON REVISITED 
Keith Chrzan 
William Hasker argues that if God necessarily prevents gratuitous evil, then 
morality is undermined. If morality is a great enough good that God need not 
prevent gratuitous evil, then atheistic arguments from the existence of gra-
tuitous evil cannot succeed. Hasker's argument confuses the issue, however, 
because gratuitous evils not necessary for the preservation of morality exist 
and suffice to support an evidential atheistic argument. 
In his recent contribution to this journal, I William Hasker discusses the con-
cept of gratuitous evil and its relation to theodicy. Specifically, he attempts 
to blunt William Rowe's2 atheistic use of gratuitous evil by arguing that 
gratuitous evil is necessary. Hasker's paper is rife with clever arguments but 
his central argument contains a flaw. Because he equivocates in defining 
"gratuitousness," Hasker's argument succumbs to a very slightly modified 
version of Rowe's argument. 
Hasker opposes William Rowe's "evidential argument from evil." If we let 
gratuitous evil mean evil "not necessary for the creation of a greater good or 
for the prevention of some equal or greater evil,"3 Rowe's evidential argument 
from evil goes like this: 
Gratuitous evils exist; 
God would prevent gratuitous evil; 
Therefore there is no god.4 
The gist of Hasker's case occurs in this argument: 
I. "God has arranged things in such a way that human beings make morally 
significant free choices between good and evil". 
2. "In order for human choices to be morally significant, morality must not 
be undermined". 
3. "If God necessarily prevents gratuitous evil, then morality is under-
mined". 
4. Therefore, "it is not the case that God is morally required to prevent 
gratuitous evil."5 
If no evils were gratuitous, any evil would necessarily lead to a greater good 
and the prohibition against, say, harming others, would be unintelligible. 
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Hasker follows Michael Peterson's lead in suggesting that the free will de-
fense may be stretched to justify God's permission of gratuitous evil.6 He has 
even taken things a step further and suggested the mechanism whereby free 
will justifies gratuitous evil. 
First, just as Peterson does,? Hasker equivocates on the meaning of gratui-
tous evil. After telling us that gratuitous evil is evil not necessary for the 
production of greater good, Hasker argues that it is necessary for preventing 
the undermining of morality. If an evil is justified because morality is under-
mined in its absence, it is odd to construe that evil as gratuitous: preventing 
the undermining of morality seems like a pretty great good. 
Let's call gratuitous evil necessary for the maintenance of morality "nec-
essary" gratuitous evil; and let "unnecessary" gratuitous evil denote gratui-
tous evils not necessary for the maintenance of morality. Now there are two 
clearly defined sets of gratuitous evil, those necessary and those unnecessary 
for the maintenance of morality. Rowe's case can be reconstructed from 
unnecessary gratuitous evil, and the problem of evil arises anew (note that, 
but for the equivocation noted earlier, it would be the same problem). Un-
necessary gratuitous evil suffices to contradict the existence of God. 
Hasker addresses the issue of unnecessary, or "excessive" amounts of gra-
tuitous evil. He argues that to reconstruct Rowe's argument from excessive 
amounts of gratuitous evil one would have to know both what an optimal 
amount of gratuitous evil is (the amount that, just barely, keeps morality from 
being undermined) and that actual gratuitous evil exceeds that optimal 
amount. He goes on to show the problems that would undermine morality if 
moral agents would or could know both of these things. 
But clearly one does not need to know both of these things to refashion 
Rowe's argument. One can imagine examples of knowing that something is 
too much without knowing the exact right amount. Hasker thinks such exam-
ples have in common a "feature which vitiate" their use: they describe a 
situation wherein there is no exact right amount. 8 But consider this example: 
heartworm pills contain arsenic-a little in a dog's bloodstream kills the 
larval parasites without adversely affecting the dog. I carelessly give my dog 
Fyodor some heartworm pills without reading the dosage information. If I 
find Fyodor dead of arsenic poisoning, I can safely conclude that I've given 
Fyodor too many heartworm pills, more than an optimal amount. I can con-
clude this even without consulting the dosage, information printed on the box 
of pills. Note that in this example, however, there is an exact right amount 
of heartworm medicine, the dosage that is optimal. One can imagine countless 
other examples: I know I've taken too much time to get to the movie theater 
when Mel Gibson has already killed the bad guys, even if I don't know what 
time the movie started (the exact time listed in this morning's paper), etc. 
Nor do we need such artificial examples to conclude that Hasker is wrong 
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about excessive gratuitous evil. Recall that excessive gratuitous evil is the 
gratuitous evil that exists over and above the (minimum) amount necessary 
to prevent the undermining of morality. This implies that excessive (unnec-
essary) gratuitous evil exists if any diminution in the amount of gratuitous 
evil fails to undermine morality. In just one of his several feats of mass 
homicide, Stalin conducted a terror-famine that killed 7 million Soviet peas-
ants in the 1930's. A decade later, in addition to starting a war costing tens 
of millions of lives, Hitler murdered 6 million Jews; and 30 years after that, 
Pol Pot slaughtered perhaps 2 million of his subjects. If one fewer small child 
had perished in each of these atrocities, would morality be undermined? What 
about 1,000 fewer small children in each? No one (but God) knows what an 
optimal amount of gratuitous evil might be, but pretty clearly morality would 
not be undermined had fewer children died in any, or each, of these horrors. 
Gratuitous evils could have been fewer with no undermining of morality, so 
excessive, unnecessary gratuitous evil exists. 
We can safely conclude that there is too much gratuitous evil, that some 
actual gratuitous evil is excessive, or unnecessary, unless we can answer 
"Yes" or even "Gee, I'm not sure" to some such question as "Would morality 
be undermined by a Holocaust of 5 million lives, a terror-famine of 4 million 
souls and/or a Cambodian depopulation of only a million lives?" There is so 
much unnecessary gratuitous evil, however, that we are nowhere near the 
point where such questions are even slightly difficult. Suppose conclusive 
evidence emerges that the lunatic fringe has been right all along, that the 
Holocaust never occurred. Would Hasker think morality undermined, or con-
sider morality even slightly impaired? Would he begin to construct atheistic 
arguments because of his conviction that significant moral freedom did not 
exist? Pretty obviously not. I conclude that unnecessary gratuitous evil exists, 
and God does not. 
Clearly we need not know the optimal amount of gratuitous evil to know 
that what we have is too much. Hence Hasker's case against reconstructing 
Rowe's argument from unnecessary or excessive gratuitous evil fails. So 
Hasker's argument succumbs to a Phoenix-like resurrection of the argument 
from unnecessary gratuitous evil and it fails to stop the evidential problem 
of gratuitous evil. 
Goshen, Indiana 
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